An efficient computational Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge whose security relies on the NP-completeness of the Independent Set Problem is presented here. The proposed algorithm is constructed from a bit commitment scheme based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, which guarantees the fulfillment of soundness, completeness and computational zero-knowledge properties, and allows avoiding the use of the Graph Isomorphism Problem, which is present in every known Zero-Knowledge Proofs for the Independent Set Problem.
Introduction
The notion of Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) is nowadays one of the most widely studied in the cryptographic bibliography. Since its introduction in [7] , it has proven to be very useful both in Complexity Theory and in Cryptography. This work deals with computational ZKP, whose existence has been proven for any NP-problem under the assumption that a one-way function exists [8] .
One of the most relevant results regarding ZKP was the demonstration that the existence of perfect zero-knowledge for an NP − complete problem would cause the Polynomial Time Hierarchy to collapse [3] . Since Graph Theory is a dense source of NP problems, several computational ZKP for different graph problems such as isomorphism, nonisomorphism, hamiltonian circuits, clustering and independent set have been introduced in the literature, [2] . One of the major drawbacks of the approach followed by all those proposals is the fact that they are related in some way to the same basic problem, the Graph Isomorphism, whose computational complexity is not yet known, and even the problem seems to be easy for most random graphs [4] . On the contrary, this work proposes a new computational ZKP for the IS P whose security relies on the presumably intractable Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). defined as a two-party cryptographic protocol that allows an infinitely powerful prover Alice (A) to convince a probabilistic polynomial time verifier Bob (B), beyond any reasonable doubt, that she knows some verifiable information such as the solution of a given difficult problem, in a way that does not help him to determine anything about this information.
Notations and Definitions
Regarding the basic problems of the proposed algorithm, on the one hand, the DLP may be described as follows. Let p be a prime, let g be a generator of Z * p (the multiplicative group of integers modulo p) and let x be an integer between 0 and p − 1. Define DLP p,g (x) to be y such that 0 < y < p, g y = x (mod p). Such a problem is in NPI class, which means that no probabilistic polynomial algorithm is known for solving it. On the other hand, the IS P is an NP − complete problem that may be defined as follows. Given a graph G = (V, E), it consists in finding a size k subset I ⊆ V (independent set) such that no two vertices in I are joined by an edge in E. A useful method to hide an independent set in a graph such that it is resistant to general heuristic approaches has been described in [1] . Due to its robustness, this method may be used in the instances generation of the proposed algorithm. The choice of the IS P as base for the proposal seems quite convenient since recent work on network security [6] has pointed as an important contribution to the field of the design of protocols for broadcast channels the definition of efficient ZKP for the IS P.
The Algorithm
A Computational ZKPK for the IS P that uses a bit commitment scheme based on the DLP is now presented. In our proposal A's inputs are a graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, and her goal is to convince B that she knows a size k independent set of G.
In a pre-processing stage A generates at random a graph G with n vertices and an embedded secret independent set I of size k, and publishes her inputs (G, k). Such a construction allows that the embedded secret independent set I may be used in practice as A's secret identification because hiding the secret subset I takes polynomial time. During the processing stage, in each iteration A generates a c-colouring of G where the k vertices of I have the same colour, which is not used for any other vertex. It must be pointed out that the number of colours c is not restricted to any value, so the computation of such a c-colouring takes polynomial time.
A's secret commitment is then formed by c binary n- • when b = 1, B verifies that
Complexity Analysis
The random generation of a graph G with n vertices and an embedded independent set of size k takes O ((n − k) 2 ). The colouring is accomplished through a well-known greedy heuristic that takes O(n 3 ) in the worst-case. In order to build the instances of the DLP, A should generate c prime numbers and use the modular exponentiation algorithm c·n times whose complexity is O(c · n · log 3 l) (where
The response associated to the challenge b = 0 takes constant time, whereas if the challenge chosen by B is b = 1 the computation of the answer takes linear time. Hence, the complexity associated to A may be estimated by O(n 3 ), which confirms that the assumed restriction of the capabilities of A to polynomial time is possible. The exponential operations corresponding to B take O(c · log 3 l). Regarding the communication complexity, in the pre-processing stage the prover should publish the graph G = (V, E), whose size is O(|E| · log(n)). Furthermore, the committed vectors are formed by n · c integers and the response to both challenges is composed by two integers, so the corresponding communication complexity of the algorithm is O(m · c · log(n)). A question that deserves special attention is the choice of parameters such as n, c and p i . To guarantee the security of the scheme, graph's size n and primes p i should be large enough, whereas it is convenient that the number of colours c be small in order to reduce communication complexity. Also generation and computer representation of random graphs G are important factors. Experimental analyses of generations of graphs guaranteeing the difficulty of the IS P [1] , recommends the use of n > 1000.
